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Abstract. This article values equity and corporate debt by taking into account
the fact that in practice the default point diﬀers from the liquidation point and that
it might be in the creditors’ interest to delay liquidation. The article develops a
continuous time asset pricing model of debt restructuring which explicitly considers
the inalienability of human capital. The study ﬁnds that even though in general
the creditors will not liquidate the ﬁrm on the incidence of default, but nevertheless
would liquidate the ﬁrm prematurely relative to the ﬁrst best threshold. This agency
problem leads to the breakdown of the capital structure irrelevance result.
1. Theoretical Foundation
The literature on the pricing of defaultable bonds started with Merton (1974) who applied
the contingent claims valuation insight of Black and Scholes (1973) to the pricing of
corporate bonds. He obtained closed form valuation expressions for (zero-coupon) risky
bonds, by taking the lower reorganization boundary as given. Thus in his model, default
occurred at maturity if the value of the ﬁrm was less than the payment promised to the
bondholders. Furthermore, at maturity the compensation received by the creditors is ﬁxed
and they receive the minimum of the value of the ﬁrm or the contracted payment. In the
event of a default, the control of the ﬁrm is transferred to the creditors and this default
point can also be interpreted as a liquidation point with zero bankruptcy costs. Thus, in
Merton’s model, both the lower reorganization boundary and the compensation received
by the bondholders is taken to be exogenous. In practice, however, the compensation
received by the creditors may vary continuously with the value of the ﬁrm if the ﬁrm is
in ﬁnancial distress. Furthermore, Merton does not make the distinction between default
and liquidation.
There have been a number of extensions of the Merton model. Black and Cox (1976)
incorporate bond indenture provisions. Jones, Mason and Rosenfeld (1984) consider mul-
tiple issue of callable coupon debt. In both of these models however the induced lower
boundary at which the ﬁrm is liquidated is taken to be exogenous. Further, default is
again tantamount to bankruptcy in these models.
Leland (1993) and Leland and Toft (1996) extend Merton’s analysis by endogenising
the lower reorganization boundary. By assuming that the equityholders will always issue
equity to prevent a default, they obtain expressions for the values of risky debt via the
smooth-pasting condition. Thus in their models, the equityholders keep on issuing equity
(when necessary) to avoid a default until the value of equity falls to zero. Thus default
occurs when the value of equity falls to zero and this default point is again synonymous
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with bankruptcy. They do admit that default need not lead to bankruptcy in practice,
but nevertheless they interpret their default point as the bankruptcy point. Since their
default and bankruptcy points are in eﬀect the same, the compensation received by the
creditors in the event of a default is again exogenous and is just equal to value of the ﬁrm
adjusted for bankruptcy costs.
Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) also consider
endogenous bankruptcy and they model the strategic behaviour of debtors. In their
models, the debtors act strategically and always try to pay as low a coupon as possible.
In good times when the liquidation value of the ﬁrm is high, the debtors will not pay
lower than the contracted amount as they would realise that it would then be in the
creditors’ interest to reject their oﬀer and liquidate the ﬁrm. However, the debtors might
underperform the debt contract even if the ﬁrm is not experiencing any liquidity problems.
They will do this when the liquidation value of the ﬁrm is not suﬃciently high and thus
when subsequently it would be not in the creditors’ interest to reject the oﬀer. Thus in
their models, the debtors might default continuously and they will continue to do so until
the creditors ﬁnally reject the oﬀer. At this point the ﬁrm will be liquidated.
Thus their models are similar to our model in the sense that endogenous bankruptcy
occurs and that this bankruptcy point will in general be diﬀerent from the default point.
However there are a number of diﬀerences. We do not consider strategic debt service.
In our model the debtors do not act strategically because once a default occurs, debt
covenants are triggered oﬀ and this gives the creditors an option to either liquidate the
ﬁrm or keep the ﬁrm running. In either case the debtors then only get the value of their
outside option. Thus as long as the ﬁrm is in default the debtors’ payoﬀ is limited to their
outside option and the creditors get most of the bargaining power as they can always
threaten to liquidate. However the creditors are aware of the fact that they cannot run
the ﬁrm without the manager because of her inalienable human capital. We therefore
explicitly model the manager’s inalienable human capital. Subsequently, if the creditors
decide to keep the ﬁrm alive, they have to ensure that the manager stays in the ﬁrm. They
can do this only if they oﬀer the manager at least the value of her outside option. Hence
in the renegotiation game of our model, the creditors have bargaining power because they
hold an option to liquidate once the ﬁrm enters a default while the debtors’ bargaining
power stems from their inalienable human capital.
One important diﬀerence between Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) and our model is
that unlike their model, the creditors in our model act strategically once a default occurs.
Thus if they decide not to liquidate then they will just pay enough to the manager so as
to retain her human capital and will thus in eﬀect become the residual claimants until the
ﬁrm exits default.
Mella-Barral (1999) obtains some results which are quite similar to ours. Like our
model, one of the objectives of his model is to explain why default rarely coincides with
liquidation. Like us, he also shows why it might be rational for the creditors not to liqui-
date even if the debtors do not have any bargaining power. This is because renegotiating
the debt can actually increase the market value of debt by avoiding ill-timed liquidation.
However, there are a number of important diﬀerences. Mella-Barral considers two
mirror games where either the creditors are in a position to make take-it-or leave-it oﬀers to
debtors or the debtors can have the ﬁrst mover advantage. In the former case the debtors
do not have any bargaining power and once a default occurs, the creditors themselves
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not to default if the ﬁrm was being liquidated at an ineﬃciently early stage.1 Thus in his
model the debtors do not have any bargaining power if the creditors have the ﬁrst mover
advantage. On the other hand in our model, the debtors always have bargaining power
over the creditors as they have perfectly inalienable human capital. They can always
threaten (the creditors) to leave the ﬁrm if they do not get at least the value of their
outside option. Furthermore, in our case liquidity problems determine the default point.
Conversely, Mella-Barral assumes that liquidity problems do not have any inﬂuence on the
default point as the debtors can keep on issuing equity to avoid a default. Subsequently
in his model, default is endogenous and is the point where it is optimal for the debtors
to irreversibly exchange their current claim for a residual claim which they will get on
bankruptcy. In our set-up default occurs because of liquidity problems and is therefore
exogenous. Further, in our case there is no irreversible exchange of claims and either
party may get their original claims if the ﬁrm manages to exit default. In Mella-Barral’s
analysis, a capital structure irrelevance result holds after renegotiation. However, the
Modigliani Miller Theorem will in general not hold in our setting.
Perhaps the most signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two analyses is that in Mella-
Barral’s model once a default occurs it is necessary to oﬀer new debt contracts to investors
in order to exit the default state. The alterations in the debt contract are not temporary.
If a default problem arises again, then another debt contract has to be drawn up. Thus
Mella-Barral allows for an unlimited sequence of new contractual arrangements. Thus in
his analysis new debt contracts have to be drawn up continuously every time the ﬁrm
enters default. This is not the case in our framework. In our model, if the ﬁrm goes
into ﬁnancial distress and thus defaults, then the ﬁrm undergoes a reorganization period
where a trustee or an administrator tries to solve the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial problems. If they
manage to bring the ﬁrm out of default then the old contract governs again. If however,
the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial position worsens then ﬁnally the ﬁrm will be liquidated. Hence any
alterations in the payoﬀ functions of both the debtors and the creditors on default are
only temporary and are thus reversible. This is consistent with the US Trust Indenture
Act of 1939 which prohibits ﬁrms from permanently changing the ‘core’ terms of the bond
indenture, which include the principal amount, the interest rate and the stated maturity,
unless all the creditors agree unanimously.2
Recently a number of other studies have also incorporated endogenous liquidation.
Leland (1998) extends his earlier work by considering the eﬀects of asset substitution on
debt pricing. As in his earlier work he does not make the separation between default
and liquidation. Hege and Mella-Barral (2000) extend Mella-Barral (1999) by taking into
account multiple creditors. Christensen et al. (2001) consider callable perpetual debt
where both the upper and lower reorganization points are derived endogenously. Their
work is an extension of the strategic debt service models of Anderson and Sundaresan
(1996) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) to a set-up where the entire debt rather
than just the current coupon payment is renegotiated. This feature is similar to our
model, as in our framework all the coupon payments, rather than just the current one,
are altered in the default region. However, unlike Christensen et al. this alteration is not
permanent and is reversible.
1Mella-Barral (1999) makes a distinction between ‘early’ liquidation and ‘late’ liquidation. In his model
‘early’ liquidation occurs if the debtors decide to default too early relative to the ﬁrst best liquidation
point. ‘Late’ default occurs if the debtors do not default even if it is (ﬁrst best) eﬃcient to do so.
2If the ﬁrm goes to Chapter 11, then these core terms can be altered if a two-thirds majority by value
and a simple majority by number is reached within each class of creditors. However unanimity is required
outside of Chapter 11.The Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk 4
With respect to the debt pricing literature our main contribution is to provide a clear
separation between default and liquidation which is consistent with existing bankruptcy
regimes. In much of the current debt pricing literature, the entrepreneur maximising the
value of equity makes the liquidation decision. However the separation of default and
liquidation in our model enables us to delegate the liquidation decision to the creditors.
Thus in our model default is triggered by the manager, whilst the liquidation decision is
made by the creditors. This seems more natural as the occurrence of default triggers debt
covenants, which in turn might lead to liquidation by creditors.
We construct a model where default in general would not lead to immediate liquidation.
In our model, once a default occurs the debtors lose most of their control rights and the
creditors in eﬀect become the residual claimants as long as the ﬁrm remains in ﬁnancial
distress. On the occurrence of a default the control rights are passed to a creditors’
representative who then decides whether to continue or to liquidate. This decision will
be in the best interest of the creditors. The ﬁrm will be liquidated by the representative
creditor only if from the creditors’ point of view there is no beneﬁt in keeping the ﬁrm
alive. This will be the case if the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial position is very dismal or if the ﬁrm’s
insolvency further aggravates after default. However, as long as the ﬁrm is not liquidated
the debtors preserve control of the management of the ﬁrm because of their inalienable
human capital. If the ﬁrm manages to exit default then the old contract governs again
and the debtors then retain all of their control rights and are once again the residual
claimants.
This feature of our model, whereby the creditors on default appoint a representative
to make optimal decisions on their behalf but where the debtors still make the day to
day management decisions of the ﬁrm is a good approximation to most of the existing
bankruptcy regimes. For instance in the US under Chapter 11, the debtors maintain their
control of the management of the ﬁrm as the debtor-in-possession or are at least aided by
a trustee appointed by the court. Thus even after default the value of equity in practice
is not zero. This is consistent with our model where the value of equity falls to zero only
when the ﬁrm is ﬁnally liquidated. However once the ﬁrm ﬁles under Chapter 11 the
management is subject to detailed supervision by the court.
In the UK most banks hold a ﬂoating charge over the assets of a company and if
the ﬁrm is unable to meet its obligations then the banks have the power to appoint an
administrative receiver who then supervises the running of the ﬁrm and who has the
power to put the company into liquidation. Alternatively, the creditors in UK can resort
to formal reorganization by going to court. The court then appoints an administrator
who has all the powers vested in the board of directors.3 Administration is succeeded
by liquidation only if the company is unable to survive as a solvent going concern. The
UK Bankruptcy Code closely resembles the South African “judicial management” and
the Australian “oﬃcial management” and gives relatively more powers to the creditors
vis-a-vis the US Chapter 11.4
In France, the judicial arrangement (Redressment Judiciare) consists of two stages;
the observation stage and the execution stage. The observation stage in terms of our
model can be interpreted as the reorganization stage whereby both parties try to reach
an agreement to keep the ﬁrm alive. The execution stage is the liquidation stage and
3Section 17 of the UK Insolvency Act 1986 provides that the administrator shall on his appointment
take control of all the property to which the company appears to be entitled until the ﬁrm is either
restored to good health or is liquidated.
4However after the 1994 reform, Chapter 11 returned some powers to the creditors.The Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk 5
it occurs when reorganization fails. When a ﬁrm defaults and goes to court, then the
court appoints an administrator, a creditor’s representative and a supervisory judge. The
control rights pass from the debtors to the administrator working with the judge. However
the management retains control of the running of the ﬁrm. In Germany again as long as
the ﬁrm is not liquidated, the debtors retain control of management but are supervised
by an administrator representing the creditors. Thus the structure of our model closely
resembles most of the existing bankruptcy regimes.
Like Hart and Moore (1994) a central feature of our model is the inalienability of
human capital. The bargaining power of the manager in our model comes from her ability
to threaten the creditors to repudiate the contract by withdrawing her human capital.
However one of the assumptions underlying Hart and Moore’s theory of debt is that
the manager does not have any outside options and hence has a zero outside wage. On
the contrary, we do not make that assumption and we assume that the manager always
has a valuable outside assumption. This is quite realistic and as argued by Rajan and
Zingales (2000) with the increase in competition physical assets have become less unique
and managers today have many outside options.
Rajan and Zingales (2000) in their article, “The Governance of the New Enterprise” ar-
gue that powerful forces are changing the nature of the ﬁrm and the increased importance
of human capital has led to the breakdown of the traditional vertical integrated ﬁrm.
Rajan and Zingales (2000) reﬂecting on the changing nature of the modern enterprise
argue:
...perhaps the most signiﬁcant change has been to human capital. Recent
changes in the nature of the organisations, the extent and requirements of
markets, and the availability of ﬁnancing have made specialised human capital
much more important, and also much more mobile. But human capital is
inalienable, and power over it has to be obtained through mechanisms other
than ownership.
Our debt pricing model also has interesting implications for corporate ﬁnance as dis-
cussed in Section 3 of the paper. With respect to the corporate ﬁnance literature our main
contribution is to show that the Irrelevance Theorem will not hold even in the absence
of informational asymmetries, coordination problems, ﬁnancial distress costs and taxes.
We identify the ﬁrst best liquidation point and show that the introduction of debt in the
capital structure is conducive to an agency problem whereby creditors liquidate the ﬁrm
prematurely.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 constructs a continuous time
pricing model of the levered ﬁrm. We model the reorganization process and obtain an-
alytical solutions for equity and corporate debt in terms of the endogenous bankruptcy
point. We show that the default trigger will in general be diﬀerent from the point of
liquidation. In Section 3 we value the unlevered ﬁr mi nt h es a m es e t - u pa n ds h o wt h a ti n
general capital structure irrelevance will not be obtained. We then characterize the ﬁrst
best liquidation point and oﬀer an explanation as to why the Irrelevance Theorem breaks
down. Section 4 provides a discussion of our results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1. The Basic Set-up. We model a ﬁrm which is run by one owner-manager en-
dowed with specialised human capital. This human capital can be interpreted as a
technical skill which is valuable to the ﬁrm and without which the ﬁrm cannot be run.The Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk 6
Alternatively the owner-manager can be thought of as possessing an essential asset which
is vital for the operations of the ﬁrm. The manager has many outside options and her
reservation income is a. The value of her outside option, a, can therefore be considered
as her income if she decides to move back to her old job. Further, the manager requires
a minimum wage of at least a and she will leave the ﬁrm at any period if her income is
less than the sustenance level a. Hence the manager will consume at least a per period
but will consume more if the cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm is suﬃciently high given that the owner
will have residual claim in these good states of the world.
The owner has limited wealth and therefore requires ﬁnancing for the ﬁrm’s project.
This ﬁnancing is arranged through the issue of a debt contract.5 We assume that the
owner issues perpetual debt to ﬁnance the project. The terms of the debt contract require
that a coupon payment, b, be paid to creditors per instant of time. We do not allow debt
service to be funded through the issue of new securities or through asset sales. To abstract
from any coordination problems we assume that there exists a representative creditor who
m a k e so p t i m a ld e c i s i o n so nb e h a l fo fac o h e s i v eg r o u po fc r e d i t o r s . 6
We suppose that capital markets are frictionless and that there are no informational
asymmetries between agents. Further, all agents are risk neutral and the term structure
of interest rates is ﬂat with a nonstochastic rate, r. The assumption of risk neutrality is
without much loss of generality. The model can be developed using risk neutrality with
ordinary probabilities, or alternatively under risk aversion with risk neutral probabilities.
(See Harrison and Kreps (1979) for a discussion.) Finally, we assume that the liquidation
value of the ﬁrm’s project is given by K.
2.2. The critical default trigger. The ﬁrm’s underlying state variable is cash ﬂows,
x, which follow a geometric brownian motion, i.e.
dx = αxdt + σxdw (1)
where the parameters α and σ represent the drift and volatility terms respectively and
dw is the increment of a standard Wiener process. Note that we do not assume that there
exist traded securities such that any new claim can be priced by dynamically replicating
already existing securities. Hence we do not require the completeness of markets and the
stochastic changes in x need not be spanned by existing assets in the economy. Many
corporate ﬁnance valuation models use the classical contingent claims pricing approach
and use the value of the unlevered ﬁrm as the basic state variable. However contingent
claims analysis assumes that markets are suﬃciently complete and as pointed out by
Christensen et al. (2001) it is impossible to have both the unlevered ﬁrm and the optimally
levered ﬁrm to coexist as trading assets.
In our model, default occurs because of liquidity problems. This is because like Ander-
son and Sundaresan (1996) we assume that debt service is met out of cash ﬂows and that
the ﬁrm cannot issue additional equity or debt to avoid a default. This is not a very strin-
gent assumption as it might ﬁrst appear. In practice, debt covenants frequently restrict
the issue of additional debt with senior or equal status. Similarly, loan indentures quite
5The debt contract is thus justiﬁable given the limited wealth of the owner.
6This is a reasonable assumption which is consistent with most of the exsiting bankruptcy codes. For
instance, Chapter 11 provides an automatic stay against creditors’ claims to avoid credior harrassment
during the reorganization process. Thus creditors are prevented from foreclosing on their collateral.
Nevertheless coordination problems can exist during the voting process (unless a ‘cram down’ is imposed)
or in out-of-court restructurings.The Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk 7
often forbid the liquidation of ﬁrm’s assets by owners as this could potentially undermine
collateral values.
To simplify our analysis we also do not allow the ﬁrm to issue junior debt or equity. In
some respects this brings us closer to reality. It is very rare for ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress
to issue equity so as to avoid a default on its ﬁnancial obligations. In a rational market,
agents would realise that equity is being issued to prevent a default and thus any sale
of equity would further decrease the suppressed value of shares.7 Firms can in principle
issue junior debt to avoid a default but this would be very costly for the issuing ﬁrm.
The reason is that if a ﬁrm is in ﬁnancial distress then the addition of further debt in its
ﬁnancial structure would just increase the debt servicing obligations of the ﬁrm and hence
increase the likelihood of a default in future periods. Further, as argued by Anderson and
Sundaresan (1996) the ﬁxed costs relating to the issue of securities are likely to be higher
for ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress and hence it may not be feasible for the ﬁrm to issue new
securities. For all these reasons the addition of new claimants would most likely just delay
default for a short period of time rather than prevent it. Nevertheless extending the model
to allow for the issue of new securities would be an interesting area for further research.
Since in our model, default occurs because of liquidity problems facing the ﬁrm, hence
the critical default point is determined exogenously. Default occurs whenever the ﬁrms
current cash ﬂows are not enough to meet its debt obligations. We conjecture the following.
Conjecture 1. Assume that the ﬁrm has issued perpetual debt with coupon payment b
and principle b/r.8 Suppose that the value of the manager’s outside option is given by
a.L e t
∧
x denote the critical level of cash ﬂows below which the ﬁrm will default on its
debt payments and suppose that the ﬁrm cannot issue new securities or liquidate assets
to service its debt. Then the critical default point of the ﬁrm is given by
∧
x = a + b (2)
It is quite straightforward to see why Conjecture 1 h o l d si fw es u p p o s ef o rt h em o m e n t
that the debtors will not act strategically when servicing their debt payments. Clearly if
debtors do not act strategically then the default point will be given by Eqn. (2). This
is because the owner needs to consume at least a per period. Thus in every period the
owner will ﬁrst take out a portion a of the cash ﬂows before servicing its debt. Since the
owner is obliged to pay a coupon of b period to the bondholders, thus default will occur
whenever the cash ﬂow falls below a + b. Thus the critical default point is
∧
x.
Once a default occurs, debt covenants are triggered which gives creditors the right to
liquidate. However the creditors might not ﬁnd it in their interest to liquidate the ﬁrm
and hence might want the ﬁrm to continue. Hence the occurrence of a default gives the
creditors an option to liquidate which the creditors may or may not exercise.
A key feature of our model is that if the creditors decide to continue then the control
rights are essentially transferred to the creditors as long as the ﬁrm is in the default state.
For our purposes, control rights can be deﬁned as the right to control the distribution
7This would also be true in the presence of asymmetric information in ﬁnancial markets. Myers and
Majluf (1984) argue that the issue of equity is taken as a bad signal by market participants and this
therefore depresses stock prices.
8Like Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) we assume that the debt principal is b/r.T h i si sp u r e l yf o r
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of the ﬁrm’s resources.9 The reason why a transfer of control rights occurs on default is
that as long as the ﬁrm is in default the creditors are getting less than their contracted
payments and hence have the ﬁrst right to the ﬁrms cash ﬂows.10 We claim the following.
Claim 1. The debtors will not default unless faced by liquidity problems and hence will
not act strategically if a transfer of control rights occurs from the debtors to the creditors
once the ﬁrm enters default. Hence, Conjecture 1 is true.
To show why the owner will not act strategically, suppose on the contrary that the
owner decides to default even if the ﬁrm is in a healthy state and hence can meet its debt
obligations. Suppose the owner decides to underperform the contract and pays less than
the contracted coupon payment, b, to the creditors and further threatens to withdraw
her inalienable human capital if the creditors do not accept her oﬀer. If the owner pays
an amount slightly over rK to the creditors, then the creditors would not ﬁnd it in their
interest to liquidate as liquidation will just fetch them a scrap value of K.11 However, the
creditors can decide not to exercise their option to liquidate and would actually prefer to
let the ﬁrm continue if its fundamentals are strong enough. If the creditors continue then
they will realise that the owner’s threat to withdraw her human capital is not credible,
given that they would now have the control rights. Once the creditors get the control
rights they will oﬀer the owner an amount slightly over a such that the owner will then
have to accept the creditors’ oﬀer. The owner will foresee this outcome ex ante and will
realise that her threat to withdraw her human capital is not credible. Hence the subgame
perfect strategy of the owner will be not to default unless faced by liquidity problems.
Thus Conjecture 1 is consistent with a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
A key distinction between our model and the strategic debt servicing models of An-
derson and Sundaresan (1996) and Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) is that in our case
a transfer of control rights occurs from the debtors to the creditors as long as the ﬁrm
remains in default. It is because of this shift of the control rights that the debtors in our
set-up do not act strategically. They are aware of the fact that on default, they will lose
their control rights and hence will then be limited to the value of their outside option.
Hence the debtors do not ﬁnd it advantageous to strategically service the debt. However
i ft h ed e b t o r sa r ea l w a y si nc h a r g eo ft h ec o n t r o lr i g h t so ft h eﬁrm then they will ﬁnd it
worthwhile to act strategically as in that case they can aﬀord to make a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer and the creditors will not be able to respond with an oﬀer of their own.
2.3. The reorganization process. Once the cash ﬂows fall below the critical level
∧
x, a default occurs and debt covenants are triggered. The creditors then have an option
to either let the ﬁrm continue or to stop and liquidate. We thus solve for the creditors’
optimal stopping problem. Before solving for the creditors’ optimal stopping rule we need
to consider the game between the creditors and the manager on the occurrence of a default.
We thus embed a game theoretic approach in our continuous time asset pricing model to
ascertain the equilibrium payoﬀsi nd i ﬀerent states of the world. The outcome of these
9Strictly speaking a distinction should be made between control rights and cash ﬂow rights. The latter
would be the right over the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows whilst the former would be the right to control the liquidation
decision. This diﬀerence does not matter in our case as creditors have both control rights and cash ﬂow
rights when the ﬁrm is in default.
10This can be interpreted as the appointment of a creditors’ respresentative to oversee management
and to ensure the protection of creditors’ interest.
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games critically depend on the relative bargaining power between the two parties. Unlike
most of the debt pricing models which give all the bargaining power to either the creditors
or the debtors, we consider a case where both parties have some bargaining power during
the reorganization process.
As argued by Rajan and Zingales (2000), there are diﬀerent sources of power. Power
can be derived through the rules of the bargaining process. For instance, the party with
the ﬁrst mover advantage might exert some power on the other. Alternatively, a negotiator
c a ne x e r tp o w e ri fs h ep o s s e s s e ss o m ev a l u a b l er e s o u r c ew h i c hi sr e q u i r e di nt h ep r o d u c t i o n
process. These are the two sources of power that we consider in our game.
In the game that we consider, creditors act as the Stackelberg leader and make take-
it-or-leave-it oﬀers to managers. Once a default is triggered, creditors can either continue
or liquidate the ﬁrm. If they decide to continue than they get the control rights. They
then realise that if they pay anything less than a to the owner-manager then the manager
will take her human capital and leave. Further they are aware that the manager’s human
capital is inalienable and the ﬁrm cannot be run without her specialised knowledge. Hence
the creditors pay the manager just enough so as to retain her human capital. They do
this by oﬀering the manager the value of her outside option. The manager hence accepts
the oﬀer. Thus rejecting never occurs in equilibrium. Hence in the subgame perfect
equilibrium, the creditors oﬀer an amount a in every period to the manager which the
manager accepts. This will be the case as long as the ﬁrm is in default.
Note that the creditors derive their bargaining power from their option to liquidate
the ﬁrm. It is this option which gives them the ﬁrst mover advantage. The manager on
the other hand inﬂuences the bargaining process because of her inalienable human capital.
The higher the value of her outside option the more will be her share of the bargaining
power. However if the value of her outside option is too high, then the creditors might be
better oﬀ by just liquidating the ﬁrm.
Once a default occurs, a fraction ϕ of the cash ﬂows is lost every instant of time. This
fraction represents the cost of ﬁnancial distress, for instance, lawyers’ charges, adminis-
trator’s fees, or possibly a loss of possible proﬁtable investment opportunities as managers
might be distracted because of their dealings with the creditors.
Hence if the creditors continue then their payoﬀ will be (θx − a) per period, where
θ =1− ϕ. If they liquidate then they get K. If the creditors decide to continue, then
they keep their option alive and in the next time period (if the ﬁrm stays in default) they
again have the option to liquidate. Thus, there is value in waiting. Hence by solving
the creditors’ dynamic programming problem, we can determine the value of their option
which is given by
F(x)=m a x{K,[θx − a]dt + E[F (x + dx)exp(−rdt)]}.( 3 )
where E is the expectations operator. Note that the continuation value is given by C(x)=
[θx − a]dt+E[F (x + dx)exp(−rdt)]. It is just the payoﬀ which the creditors appropriate
in the current period plus the expected present value of the option which they retain.
The liquidation point, x∗, is thus determined endogenously. It is the point at which the
creditors are indiﬀerent between continuing and liquidating. Hence it is the value of x
such that the continuation value just equals the liquidation value. When x<x ∗,t h e
optimal decision for the creditors is to liquidate.
A ss h o w ni nF i g u r e1, the default point diﬀers from the liquidation point. When x
falls below
∧
x, default occurs but this need not automatically lead to liquidation. If the
ﬁrm’s condition further deteriorates and its liquidity problems are aggravated then theThe Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk 10
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Figure 1: Default and Liquidation. The ﬁgure shows how default and liquidation are determined
by the state variable. Default occurs when the state variable hits
∧
x. Liquidation occurs when
the state variable falls further to x∗.
ﬁrm would ﬁnally be liquidated by the creditors. Hence liquidation will take place when
the state variable falls below x∗.
2.4. Valuation of equity and corporate debt. As long as the ﬁrm is in the default
region, as depicted in Figure 1, the creditors will have the control rights. However, if the
ﬁrm manages to overcome its liquidity problems and is restored to a healthy condition,
then the control rights are transferred back to the debtors. Thus the creditors are in eﬀect
the residual claimants as long as the ﬁrm stays in default. Nevertheless as long as the
ﬁrm is not liquidated there is always the likelihood that the debtors will retain the control
rights. Thus for low ﬁrm values the creditors act as the residual claimants but for high
enough ﬁrm values the debtors will be the residual claimants.
Since the control rights can alter from the debtors to the creditors and vice versa, thus
the payoﬀs of both the parties will be state dependent. Furthermore any change in the
payoﬀ function will be temporary and reversible until and unless the ﬁrm is liquidated.
This feature of our model brings us closer to reality and we do not need to rely on payoﬀ
functions, the changes of which are permanent and hence irreversible.
As long as the ﬁrm is doing well and is not in default, the equityholders will be the
residual claimants and their payoﬀs will be given by x − a − b. However in bad states
of the word, the equityholders will just earn the value of their outside option and hence
their payoﬀ will be zero.12 The payoﬀ to the equityholders is thus given by
e(x)=
(







Therefore, at any instant the proﬁt ﬂow to the equity holders is given by
e(x)=m a x[ x − a − b,0].
Notice that the equityholders have a call option on the ﬁrm at every instant in time.
The option, if exercised at time t means that the equityholders will appropriate the current
earnings of the ﬁrm in time t g i v e na ne x e r c i s ep r i c eo fa+b. Since each option can only be
exercised at that very instant, the equityholders have a number of European call options.
However once the state variable hits x∗, the call option of the equityholders becomes
w o r t h l e s sa st h eﬁrm is then liquidated. Hence the value of equity is the sum of the
12Note that the value of the owner-manager’s outside option is correctly treated as an opportunity cost
for the ﬁrm.The Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk 11
value of all these call options and it is therefore dependent on the state variable. As x
approaches x∗, the value of equity declines. Conversely, the value of equity increases as
the earnings of the ﬁrm rise.
In this model, equity and debt are time homogenous securities and hence their values
are time independent. Using standard no-arbitrage arguments the values of equity and
debt can be expressed in terms of the cash ﬂow process. It can be shown that, in this
environment, the value of any time independent claim which is a function of the cash ﬂow
process, x, will satisfy the following ordinary diﬀerential equation
1
2
σ2x2S00(x)+αxS0(x) − rS(x)+s(x)=0 (5)
where S(x) is the value of security S which is a twice continuously diﬀerentiable function
of the state variable x,a n ds(x) is the payoﬀ function of that security.
Thus the value of equity, E, will satisfy the following diﬀerential equation
1
2
σ2x2E00(x)+αxE0(x) − rE(x)+e(x)=0 (6)
where e(x) is as deﬁned in Eqn. (4). To solve for the value of equity we need appropriate
boundary equations. Let E1 be the value of equity when x ≥
∧
x and E2 be the value of
equity when x<
∧




































E2 (x∗)=0 .( 10)
Eqn. (7) will hold if asset prices are free of speculative bubbles. It just says that as
x grows large the value of equity approaches the expected discounted integral of future
payoﬀs which will accrue to the equityholders, i.e. as x increases the value of equity
approaches Et
R ∞
t (x−a−b)exp[−r(u−t)]du. Eqn. (8) is the value-matching condition at
default. Eqn. (9) says that the slope of the value function of equity has to be continuous
at the default point. This follows from Claim (1) as it is optimal for debtors to default
only when the ﬁrm is facing liquidity problems. Finally, Eqn. (10) is the value-matching
condition at liquidation and it says that the value of equity ﬁnally falls to zero when the
ﬁrm is liquidated.
Solving the diﬀerential equation (6), subject to the above boundary conditions, we
show in the Appendix that we get the following result.
Proposition 1. Let E(x) denote the value of the levered ﬁrm’s equity. Assume that the
ﬁrm has issued perpetual debt with coupon payment b and principle b/r. Suppose that
the value of the manager’s outside option is given by a. Then if the debt is risky13, i.e.
K<b / r , the value of equity is given by
13For completeness, in the appendix, we also derive the value of equity for the simpler and less interesting
case, when debt is riskless, i.e. when K ≥ b/r.The Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk 12
E(x)=

     
     






















































































The powers ξ1 and ξ2 are the positive and negative roots respectively of the characteristic
quadratic equation ξ (ξ − 1)σ2/2+ξα− r =0 .
The solution of the equity function from Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 2. Note
that the value of equity is positive even in the default region even though the economic
payoﬀ to the equityholders in this region is zero. This is because as long as the ﬁrm is
not liquidated, there is always a positive probability that the ﬁrm might exit default and
hence the equity holders might be able to earn economic proﬁts in the future.
Next we value the corporate debt issued by the ﬁrm. The payoﬀ function of bond-





b for x ∈ [
∧
x,∞)
θx − a for x ∈ [x∗,
∧
x)
rK for x ∈ [0,x ∗)
(12)
where x∗ is the endogenous point of liquidation chosen by the bondholders. Eqn. (12)
states that the bondholders get the full contracted payment in good states of the world.
However, in the default region, the bondholders get less than their contracted coupon
payment because of the insuﬃcient cash ﬂows generated by the ﬁrm. The payoﬀ of the
bondholders in the default region is θx − a per instant of time, where θ =1− ϕ.T h i s
is because, as long as the creditors decide to keep the ﬁrm alive, they have to pay the
manager the value of her outside option, a. Furthermore, in this state of the world,
af r a c t i o nϕ of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂo w si sl o s td u et oﬁnancial distress costs. Opler and
Titman (1994) ﬁnd evidence that levered ﬁrms incur substantial ﬁnancial distress costs
in industry downturns. These losses might take diﬀerent forms. They might be customer
driven as customers might be reluctant to do business with ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms.
These losses might also be competitor driven if it is the case that ﬁnancially stronger ﬁrms
take advantage of their weaker counterparts by aggressive pricing in an attempt to drive
out the ﬁrms experiencing distressed times. More directly, these costs will also reﬂect
lawyers fees, etc.14 Finally, the bondholders appropriate the scrap value, K, when the
ﬁrm is liquidated and their payoﬀ henceforth is rK per instant of time.
14The study by Opler and Titman (1994) ﬁnds that the costs of ﬁnancial distress are more pronounced
for highly leveraged ﬁrms. Thus, we would expect ϕ to vary with leverage. It will be relatively higher for
ﬁrms with more debt in their capital structure.The Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk 13
The bondholders’ payoﬀ function is piecemeal right continuous and is depicted in panel
(a) of Figure 3. Note that it is discontinuous at the points
∧
x and x∗. In the absence of
arbitrage, the value function of debt, B(x) and its ﬁrst derivative B0(x) must both be
continuous at the points
∧
x and x∗.T h u s ,t h ep a y o ﬀ function will be discontinuous if and
only if the second derivative of the value function, B00(x) is discontinuous at the points
∧
x
and x∗. (This is clear on examination of the ODE (13)). Dumas (1991)h a ss h o w nt h a tf o r
optimal stopping problems, smooth-pasting remains a condition only involving the ﬁrst
derivative of claim values and not the second derivative. This therefore would explain
the discontinuities in the payoﬀ function.15 The payoﬀ function of the equityholders (4)
analogous to the payoﬀ function of the bondholders will be piecemeal right continuous
and for the same reasoning will be discontinuous at the point
∧
x.
The value of debt, B(x), will satisfy the following diﬀerential equation
1
2
σ2x2B00(x)+αxB0(x) − rB(x)+p(x)=0 (13)
where p(x) is as deﬁned in Eqn. (12). To solve for the value of corporate bonds we need
to specify appropriate boundary conditions. Let B1 be the value of debt when x ≥
∧
x.W e
know that once a default occurs, the bondholders have the option to liquidate, and the
value of their option is given by F(x)=m a x{K,C(x)},w h e r eC(x) as deﬁned earlier is the
value of debt in the continuation region, i.e. C(x)=( θx − a)dt+E[F(x + dx)exp(−rdt)].































C0 (x∗)=0 .( 18)
These boundary conditions have the following interpretations. Eqn. (14) is the no bubbles
condition which states that as the state variable approaches higher and higher values, the
value of debt approaches the value of risk free debt. In the limit, when the cash ﬂow has
an inﬁnite value, the debt of the ﬁrm is essentially risk free and its value is just equal
to the present value of the coupon payments. Eqn. (15) is the value-matching condition
at the default point. Eqn. (16) states that the value of debt must be continuously
diﬀerentiable across x. Since the Brownian motion of the state variable can diﬀuse freely
across the default boundary, for no arbitrage the claim value cannot change abruptly.
Dixit (1993) shows that the if the ﬂow payoﬀ function changes, then the value function
should not change abruptly and thus the ﬁrst derivative of the value function should be
15Thus the “super-contact condition” whereby the smooth-pasting condition can be expressed in terms
of the second derivative will not apply to our case. See Dumas (1991)f o rd e t a i l s .The Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk 14
continuous for the absence of arbitrage. (See Karatzas and Shreve (1998) for a more
rigorous discussion). Eqn. (17) is the value-matching condition at liquidation. From the
Bellman equation (3) we know that in the creditors’ stopping region, the value of their
option to liquidate is just equal to the scrap value of the ﬁrm, and hence by continuity we
can impose the value-matching condition (17). Eqn. (18) is the standard smooth-pasting
condition which determines the optimal stopping point for the creditors. Thus when the
state variable falls below x∗ the creditors will ﬁnd it in their interest to enforce liquidation.
As shown in the Appendix, solving the diﬀerential equation (13) given the boundary
conditions just described yields the following result.
Proposition 2. Assume that the ﬁrm has issued perpetual debt with coupon payment b
and principle b/r. Suppose that the value of the manager’s outside option is given by a.
Suppose that a fraction ϕ of the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂo w si sl o s ti nﬁnancial distress costs as long
as the ﬁrm is in default and that θ =1−ϕ.L e tB(x) denote the value of corporate debt.
Then if the debt is risky, i.e. K<b / r , the value of debt is given by
B(x)=

             
             
















































































If the debt is riskless, i.e. K ≥ b/r, then the value of debt is given by B(x)=b/r.
While we have derived a closed form solution for corporate debt, the endogenous liqui-
dation point x∗ cannot be expressed in closed form. Nevertheless, root ﬁnding algorithms
can numerically calculate x∗, given the values of other parameters. Given Proposition 2,
the Appendix shows that x∗ will be the solution to Eqn. (16). Thus the threshold x∗ can
be computed numerically from Eqn. (16) given other parametric values.
Given the form of the solution, it might be the case that for a certain range of para-
metric values x∗ <a . If that happens to be the case, then it would actually imply that
the bondholders might be willing to inject cash into the ﬁrm if the state variable drops
below a/θ. (This can readily be seen from inspection of the payoﬀ function in Eqn. (12)).
This might be the case if the scrap value of the ﬁrm is low enough relative to a high value
of the manager’s outside option. Intuition would then suggest that if the manager has a
lot of bargaining power during the reorganization process, bondholders might be willing
to inject cash so as to retain the manager’s human capital as they would realise that
liquidation would fetch them a very low value. Nevertheless they will ultimately liquidate
if the gap between the state variable, x,a n da widens.
The solution from Proposition 2 is depicted in Figure 2. Note that as is the usual case,
the value of debt is a concave function of the state variable in good states of the world.
However, in the default region the value of debt is a convex function of the state variable
reﬂecting the fact that the bondholders are in eﬀect the residual claimants as long as the












Figure 2: The dynamics of the ﬁrm and its securities. The ﬁgure shows the value function of
the levered ﬁrm, VL(x), and the values of the ﬁrm’s equity, E(x), and debt, B(x), as functions
of cash ﬂow, x.
nevertheless extract as much as is possible after paying oﬀ the manager her value of the
outside option.
The ﬁgure illustrates that default occurs when the state variable ﬁrst hits
∧
x. However
this point might not automatically result in liquidation as creditors might ﬁnd it in their
advantage to retain their option to liquidate. Nevertheless if the ﬁnancial position of the
ﬁrm is further aggravated, the creditors might ﬁnd it in their interest to liquidate the
ﬁrm. Liquidation will occur when the cash ﬂow falls below the critical level x∗.T h u st h e
liquidation point will in general diﬀer from the point of default.
3. Does the Modigliani-Miller Theorem hold?
Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that the market value of any ﬁrm is independent
of its capital structure and thus the value of a levered ﬁrm should be the same as the
v a l u eo fa nu n l e v e r e dﬁrm. However, we show that given our set-up, capital structure
irrelevance in general will not be obtained even in the absence of ﬁnancial distress costs
and taxes. We ﬁrst value an unlevered ﬁr mi nt h es a m es e t - u pa sb e f o r ea n dt h e nw e
provide an explanation as to why the value of the unlevered ﬁrm would in general diﬀer
from the value of its levered counterpart.
3.1. The Value of an Unlevered ﬁrm. We now consider the valuation of a pure
equity ﬁrm. Apart from no debt in the capital structure, the set-up is essentially the same
a sd e s c r i b e di nS e c t i o n2 . 1. The owner-manager running the ﬁrm can always shut downThe Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk 16
the ﬁrm for a scrap value of K and take her outside option a. Given a competitive labour
market, a will also be the minimum level of consumption required by the manager every
period in time. Thus the owner-manager in eﬀect has a put option to liquidate the ﬁrm,
where the exercise price of the option is K.
The value of the owner’s put option, G(x),i sg i v e nb y
G(x)=m a x{K,(x − a)dt + E[F (x + dx)exp(−rdt)]}. (20)
Hence the manager in every instant of time, has an option to shut down the ﬁrm and
fetch a value of K or to continue and get a net payoﬀ of x −a in the current period plus
retain the option to liquidate in future periods. The point of liquidation is given by
L∗ =m a x ( a,x∗
u) (21)
where x∗
u is the value of the cash ﬂows such that the scrap value just equals the continua-
tion value. The constraint (21) is imposed as the manager needs to consume a minimum
amount of a per period.16 Hence the liquidation point will be the higher of the value
of the manager’s outside option and the critical level of the state variable such that the
continuation value in Eqn. (20) just equals the scrap value.
The payoﬀs of the owner-manager are given by
v(x)=
½
x − a if x ≥ L∗
rK if x<L ∗ (22)
where L∗ is the point of liquidation chosen by the manager as described above.





u(x) − rVu(x)+v(x)=0 (23)
where v(x) is as deﬁned in Eqn. (22). To solve for the value of the unlevered ﬁrm,
appropriate boundary conditions are required. In the case of the unlevered ﬁrm, we just
have three boundary conditions, given that we do not have the issue of default here. The














These boundary conditions have straightforward interpretations. Eqn. (24) is the no
bubbles condition. Eqns. (25) and (26) are the value-matching and smooth-pasting
conditions respectively.
We show in the Appendix that solving for the diﬀerential equation (23) subject to the
boundary conditions (24),(25) and (26), the following result is obtained.
16Even though the manager will always be better oﬀ by stopping at x∗
u rather than a, nevertheless if
a>x ∗
u the manager will have to shut down when the state variable drops below a. This will be the case
given that the manager has limited wealth and cannot inject further cash into the ﬁrm.The Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk 17
Proposition 3. Let Vu(x) denote the total value of the unlevered ﬁrm. Assume that the















xξ2 if x ≥ L∗ (27)
where














Here, ξ2 is the negative root of the characteristic quadratic equation ξ(ξ−1)σ2/2+ξα−r =
0.
Note that now we are able to ﬁnd a closed form expression for the liquidation point
given the relatively simple nature of the valuation of the unlevered ﬁrm in this set-up.
For a certain range of parametric values it will be the case that x∗
u <a . In fact, it can
be shown that this will be the case if and only if K<a λ, where the parameter λ is a
constant such that λ ≡ [(ξ2 − 1)/ξ2 (r − α) − 1/r]. The intuition behind this is that if
the scrap value is very low compared to the opportunity cost of staying in the business,
then the manager would actually prefer to inject some money and keep the ﬁrm alive as
long as the state variable is above x∗
u. However as discussed in footnote 16, the manager
has limited wealth and cannot inject further cash into the ﬁrm. Further, the manager
consumes at least a per period. Given this resource constraint, the manager will have
to follow the liquidation rule as deﬁned in Eqn. (21). As discussed in Section 3.2, this
wealth constraint can actually be a potential source of ineﬃciency for the unlevered ﬁrm.
Before discussing the eﬃciency of the unlevered ﬁrm vis-a-vis the levered ﬁrm, it is
useful to restate the above fact in the following condition.
Condition 1. L∗ = a if and only if K<a λ,w h e r eλ ≡ [(ξ2 − 1)/ξ2 (r − α) − 1/r].
Condition 1 states that the unlevered ﬁrm will be liquidated at the point where the
state variable hits the value of the manager’s outside option if and only if the scrap value
of the ﬁrm is very low relative to the opportunity cost of continuing the ﬁrm.
3.2. First Best Liquidation, ineﬃciencies, and Capital Structure Relevance.
We now turn to the interesting issue of whether the value of the unlevered ﬁrm is higher
compared to its lever counterpart. To address this issue we ﬁrst need a benchmark for
eﬃciency. The values of the levered and unlevered ﬁrms will diﬀer if their liquidation
points diﬀer. Further, a measure of the ineﬃciency of the ﬁrm would be the magnitude
of the diﬀerence of its liquidation point relative to the ﬁrst best liquidation point.
Given our analysis, it is straightforward to identify the ﬁrst best liquidation point of a
ﬁrm. By deﬁnition, the ﬁrst best liquidation point of a ﬁrm is the point which maximises
the value of the ﬁrm. For the unlevered ﬁrm, the ﬁrst best liquidation point also maximises
the value of equity. As discussed in Section 3.1, the value of equity will be maximised if theThe Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk 18
manager follows the liquidation rule such that she liquidates whenever the cash ﬂows fall
below x∗
u. Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, the manager might have to liquidate earlier
given her wealth constraint, even though she would have been better oﬀ if liquidation
h a do c c u r r e da tx∗
u.T h u s , x∗
u is the optimal liquidation point as it is identiﬁed by the
smooth-pasting condition, which itself by deﬁnition is an optimality condition. Thus we
know that the value of the unlevered ﬁrm will be at a maximum if the manager follows
the liquidation rule such that she liquidates when the state variable hits x∗
u.W eh a v et h u s
proved the following Proposition.
Proposition 4. The optimal liquidation rule, which maximises the value of the ﬁrm, is
to liquidate the ﬁrm when the state variable falls below x∗
u.T h u st h eﬁrst best liquidation











Having identiﬁed the ﬁrst best eﬃcient liquidation rule, we next turn to the question
of whether the Modigliani-Miller Theorem holds and if not then whether the value of the
unlevered ﬁrm is necessarily higher than the value of the unlevered ﬁrm. From inspection
of Proposition 3 it is immediately clear that the value of the unlevered ﬁrm is not equal
to the sum of the value of equity and the value of debt of the levered ﬁrm. (The values of
the levered ﬁrm’s equity and debt are given by Propositions 1 and 2 respectively.) This is
true even if the ﬁnancial distress costs are set to zero. Therefore, an important corollary
to Proposition 3 is
Corollary 1. The Modigliani-Miller Theorem does not hold even in the absence of ﬁnan-
cial distress costs and taxes.
The reasoning behind the capital structure relevance result obtained is subtle but
naturally follows from our model. Capital structure irrelevance will not be obtained if the
liquidation point of the levered ﬁrm diﬀers from the liquidation point of the unlevered
ﬁrm. For now, lets suppose that Condition 1 is not satisﬁed and thus x∗
u >a .Thus the
manager in the unlevered ﬁrm follows the ﬁrst best liquidation rule, and liquidates when
the state variable hits x∗
u as deﬁned in Eqn. (28). Corollary 1 therefore implies that the
creditors’ liquidation point will diﬀer from the liquidation point of the manager in the
unlevered ﬁrm, i.e. x∗ 6= x∗
u. We now provide the intuition behind this.
In the levered ﬁrm, once a default occurs the creditors have the option to liquidate the
ﬁrm. In the unlevered ﬁrm, the manager always has an option to liquidate the ﬁrm for
a scrap value of K. In fact it will be the case that the creditors will exercise their (put)
option to liquidate earlier vis-a-vis the manager in the unlevered ﬁrm even in the absence
of ﬁnancial distress costs. Figure 3 compares the payoﬀ function of the creditors and
of the manager in the unlevered ﬁrm. For simplicity assume that there are no ﬁnancial
distress costs, i.e. θ =1 . Then note that both the creditors and the manager have the
same payoﬀ function for low fundamental values of the ﬁrm. In bad states of the world,
the creditors are the residual claimants and their payoﬀ is thus x − a. In the unlevered
ﬁr m ,t h em a n a g e ra l w a y si st h er e s i d u a lc l a i m a n tw i t hap a y o ﬀ of x − a as long as the
ﬁrm is not liquidated. Thus in good states of the world, while the manager is still the
residual claimant and earning x−a, the creditors payoﬀ will be capped by the amount of
the coupon payment b.
Thus both the creditors and the unlevered ﬁrm manager have put options to liquidate













Figure 3: The payoﬀ functions. Panel (a) of the ﬁgure depicts the payoﬀ function of the
bondholders in the levered ﬁrm while panel (b) depicts the payoﬀ function of the owner manager
in the unlevered ﬁrm. Both of them have options to liquidate, but in the absence of any wealth
constraints, the bondholders will liquidate earlier given their capped payoﬀ.B e c a u s e o f t h i s
“capped payoﬀ”e ﬀect, the value of the levered ﬁrm will be lower than the value of the unlevered
ﬁrm in the absence of any wealth constraints of the manager in the unlevered ﬁrm.
fact the creditors put option is less valuable due to an upper limit to their payoﬀs. The
creditors realise that their payoﬀs are capped by the amount of their coupon payment
and they take this into account when determining the liquidation point. Because of the
upper limit to the creditors’ payoﬀ, they would liquidate earlier compared to the manager
in the unlevered ﬁrm. It will therefore always be the case that x∗ >x ∗
u.W e t h u sh a v e
the following proposition.
Proposition 5. The creditors will always liquidate the ﬁrm prematurely relative to the
ﬁrst best liquidation point.
Thus if Condition 1 is not satisﬁed it will always be the case that the creditors will
liquidate earlier compared to the unlevered manager and thus the value of the unlevered
ﬁrm will be higher than the value of the levered ﬁrm, given the ineﬃciency induced in the
levered ﬁrm by the creditors’ ineﬃcient liquidation decision.17 The creditors liquidation
17We had assumed that the value of the manager’s outside option is also the minimum consumptionThe Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk 20
decision would maximise the value of their claim but not the value of the ﬁrm as a whole.
Note that the Coase theorem will fail in this environment given the limited wealth of the
manager. Thus both the parties will be unable to bargain their way towards the eﬃcient
outcome.
More generally, depending on the parametric values, the following three cases might
arise.
Case 1: a<x ∗
u <x ∗. In this case, Condition 1 is not satisﬁed and thus L∗ = x∗
u.
Thus now the wealth constraint of the managers in the unlevered ﬁrm is not binding and
hence they will follow the ﬁrst best liquidation rule as deﬁn e di nP r o p o s i t i o n4 .B u ts i n c e
x∗
u <x ∗, the creditors in the levered ﬁrm will liquidate too early and thus the value of
the levered ﬁrm will be less than the value of the unlevered ﬁrm.
Case 2: x∗
u <a<x ∗. Note that now since x∗
u <a , Condition 1 holds and thus the
wealth constraint of the manager in the unlevered ﬁrm is binding. Therefore the manager
of the unlevered ﬁrm will now liquidate when the state variable hits a and thus given
her resource constraint, the manager will be unable to follow the ﬁrst best liquidation
rule. Nevertheless the value of the unlevered ﬁrm will still be higher than the value of the
levered ﬁrm given that the liquidation rule followed by the creditors in the levered ﬁrm
is even more ineﬃcient relative to the liquidation rule being followed by the manager in
the unlevered ﬁrm. More Formally, |L∗ − x∗
u| < |x∗ − x∗
u| and thus the deviation from the
ﬁrst best liquidation rule is higher in the case of the levered ﬁrm.
Case 3: x∗
u <x ∗ <a .A g a i n ,a si nC a s e2 ,C o n d i t i o n1 holds and thus the resource
constraint of the manager in the unlevered ﬁrm is binding. Thus the liquidation point
of the unlevered ﬁrm’s manager is now given by L∗ = a. However one critical diﬀerence
between Case 1 and Case 2 is that the resource constraint is now binding at a level
which is higher than the liquidation point chosen by the creditor in the levered ﬁrm. The
implication is that now |L∗ − x∗
u| > |x∗ − x∗
u| and hence now the deviation from the ﬁrst
best level is actually higher for the unlevered ﬁrm. Thus the unlevered ﬁrm will be more
ineﬃcient, in terms of its liquidation threshold, relative to the levered ﬁrm. Thus, given
Case 3, the value of the levered ﬁrm will actually be higher than the value of the unlevered
ﬁrm.
We have now identiﬁed all possible cases that might arise. Our general result is that
the value of the levered ﬁrm will in general be not equal to the value of the unlevered
ﬁrm. Furthermore, the levered ﬁrm would never achieve the ﬁr s tb e s tg i v e na nu p p e r
limit to the creditors’ payoﬀ. Nevertheless the unlevered ﬁrm might be able to achieve
the ﬁrst best if the wealth constraint of the manager is not binding. However, if the wealth
constraint of the manager is binding, then the value of the unlevered ﬁrm may or may
not be higher than the value of the levered ﬁrm. Intuitively, the value of the unlevered
ﬁrm might happen to be lower than that of the levered ﬁrm if equityholders do not have
enough resources to achieve the ﬁrst best level.18
level which the manager would be willing to accept. This assumption is easy to justify if the manager’s
human capital is very specialised as then the value of her outside option will be quite low. Nevertheless, we
have also analysed the case where this assumption does not hold. It can then be shown that as before in
the renogotiation game the creditors will just give enough to the manager to keep her indiﬀerent between
leaving and staying in the ﬁrm. The creditors will therefore extract all the surplus in the default region.
Further, the result that the creditors liquidate prematurely relative to ﬁr s tb e s tw o u l ds t i l lh o l d .
18Note that Case 3 will arise however for only a very low liquidation value relative to a high value of
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4. Discussion
The main objectives of our study were to construct a dynamic debt pricing model that
comes close to the structure of most existing bankruptcy procedures; to explicitly incor-
porate the inalienability of the human capital which is increasingly a key feature of the
modern enterprise; and lastly but not least importantly to provide a clear distinction
between default and liquidation.
The importance of the last objective cannot be overemphasized. It is clear that most
of the companies who default go into a period of reorganization and may or may not be
liquidated. The time spent in the reorganization period varies immensely. Franks and
Torous (1989) report that in their sample, ﬁrms on average spend a period of 4 years in
Chapter 11.G i l s o n ,J o h na n dL a n g( 1990) ﬁnd that in their sample only about 5% of the
bankruptcies in Chapter 11 are converted into Chapter 7 liquidations. They report that
this proportion varies from sample to sample and other studies have found that about
one-third of the ﬁrms in Chapter 11 end up in liquidations. Franks and Sussman (2000)
in their study on distressed UK companies ﬁnd that banks use their control rights to
encourage ﬁnancially distressed ﬁrms to restructure. They ﬁnd no evidence of automatic
liquidation upon default. There are numerous examples of companies who pass through
a period of reorganization after default but come out successful. It would therefore be
incorrect to treat default and liquidation as being synonymous when modelling the levered
ﬁrm.
Our study does not only provide an arbitrage-free model for valuing equity and cor-
porate debt but also provides a framework to infer some interesting corporate ﬁnance
implications. In our framework both debtors and creditors can at any point in time be
the residual claimants. This is remarkably in contrast to the traditional “nexus of con-
tracts” deﬁnition of the ﬁrm ﬁrst provided by Jensen and Meckling (1976). As argued
by Rajan and Zingales (2000), in a world of incomplete contracts and multiple sources of
power no party has predetermined payoﬀs and any party can at some point in time have
a residual claim on the ﬁrm’s assets. This explains why maximisation of the value of the
residual claimant’s securities need not maximise the value of the ﬁrm as a whole.
As argued by Jensen (1986) one motivation for issuing debt is to commit the managers
of the ﬁrm to pay out future cash ﬂows. However for such an objective to be eﬀective
there has to be some punishment if the commitment is not fulﬁlled. This punishment can
take various forms. In our model it is the shift of the control rights that gives force to
this commitment. Managers realise that if a circumstance arises where they are unable
to service the debt, then they will be left with a gross payoﬀ that just equals the value of
their outside option.
Our framework also identiﬁes the ﬁrst best liquidation threshold which can then be
used as a benchmark to compare the eﬃciency of the unlevered ﬁrm versus the levered
ﬁrm. We ﬁnd that the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not hold even in the absence of any
coordination problems, informational asymmetries, ﬁnancial distress costs and taxes.O u r
study ﬁnds that in general the value of the levered ﬁrm will be less than the value of the
all equity ﬁrm as the creditors have an incentive to liquidate prematurely given an upper
limit to their payoﬀs. However depending on the parametric values, a situation might arise
where the value of the levered ﬁrm is greater than the value of the all equity ﬁrm. The
intuition underlying this is that the all equity ﬁrm might be cash constrained because of
which the equityholders might have to liquidate earlier than they would have wanted to if
their resource constraint had not been binding. Note that since the parametric values will
diﬀer from ﬁrm to ﬁrm and industry to industry, therefore, the eﬃciency of the liquidationThe Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk 22
thresholds vis-a-vis the ﬁrst best liquidation point will also diﬀer on a case by case basis.
Our ﬁnding that creditors liquidate the ﬁrm prematurely relative to ﬁrst best also
opens up further avenues for future research. In particular, this ﬁnding can help us provide
an alternative rationale for the use of convertible debt. In the presence of convertible debt,
creditors no longer have a payoﬀ capped by their coupon payment since they would be
willing to use their conversion option when ﬁrm fundamentals are strong enough. This
should therefore reduce their incentive to liquidate prematurely and hence the liquidation
threshold should move closer to the ﬁrst best level. Leland (1998) has shown that the
asset substitution problem identiﬁed by Green (1984) is insigniﬁcant. Thus the agency
problem of debt identiﬁed in this paper might help us to rationalise the use of convertibles
in situations where the risk shifting problem is not an issue. We intend to explore this
issue in more detail and leave this for future research.
5. Summary and Conclusions
We have set up a debt pricing model with the following features: (a) the structure of
our model closely resembles the existing bankruptcy regimes; (b) the model incorporates
the inalienability of human capital which is increasingly becoming a dominant feature of
the modern ﬁrm; (c) a clear separation between default and liquidation is obtained; (d)
the liquidation decision is made by the creditors following a default by the manager; (e)
capital structure irrelevance not obtained even in the absence of ﬁnancial distress costs
and taxes; (f) provides a framework to compare the eﬃciency of the liquidation thresholds
of diﬀerent ﬁrms. We have therefore provided a framework which is rich enough for valuing
corporate securities and inferring some useful implications for corporate ﬁnance.
APPENDIX
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 : The technical problem one faces here is that of solving the
ordinary diﬀerential equation (6) subject to the boundary conditions (7), (8), (9) and
(10). If x<
∧






2(x) − rE2(x)=0 (29)
where E2 is the value of equity when x<
∧
x.I ti se a s yt ov e r i f yt h a tt h eg e n e r a ls o l u t i o n
of Eqn. (29) is
E2(x)=N1xξ1 + N2xξ2 (30)
where N1 and N2 are the two integration constants and ξ1 and ξ2 are the positive and
negative roots respectively of the characteristic equation ξ (ξ − 1)σ2/2+ξα − r =0 .I f
x ≥
∧





1(x) − rE1(x)+x − a − b =0 (31)
where E1is the value of equity when x ≥
∧
x. The general solution to Eqn. (31)i sThe Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk 23










where x/(r−α)−a/r−b/r is the particular solution and M1 and M2 are the integration
constants. As x →∞ , xξ1 explodes. Thus, given the no bubbles condition (7), M1 must
be zero. We know that the value of equity is zero when x falls below x∗.W e t h e r e f o r e
need to determine the value of equity in the ranges x ∈ [x∗,
∧
x) and x ∈ [
∧
x,∞) which is
given by E2 and E1 respectively. We therefore now have three unknowns N1, N2 and M2
in Eqns. (30) and (32) and three equations given by the boundary conditions (8), (9) and
(10). Solving for the three unknowns, yields the solution in Eqn. (11). Q.E.D.
Value of equity with riskless debt: If K ≥ b/r, then it will always be in the interest of
the creditors to liquidate once a default occurs as they can then recover the total amount
of their principal. The default point is therefore the same as the liquidation point in this
case. Further the equityholders will be the residual claimants in all states of the world.
Their payoﬀsa r en o wg i v e nb y
e(x)=
(
x − a − b if x ≥
∧
x




It is obvious that when debt is riskless the value of equity when x<
∧
x is given by K−b/r.
We therefore need to determine the value of equity when x ≥
∧
x. The value of equity when
x ≥
∧
x will satisfy the following second order diﬀerential equation
1
2
σ2x2E00(x)+αxE0(x) − rE(x)+x − a − b =0 .
The general solution of this equation is given by































The asymptotic no bubbles condition implies that Q1 =0 . Therefore we now have one





















Proof of Proposition 2: Here we want to solve Eqn. (13) subject to boundary condi-
tions (14), (15), (16), (17) and (18). When K<b / r , the value of debt is just equal to KThe Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk 24
for x<x ∗, as when the ﬁrm is liquidated the maximum that the debtholders can get is
t h es c r a pv a l u eo ft h eﬁrm. Let the value of debt be C(x) for x ∈ [x∗,
∧
x).T h e ng i v e nt h e
payoﬀ function in Eqn. (12), Eqn. (13) becomes
1
2
σ2x2C00(x)+αxC0(x) − rC(x)+θx − a =0 . (37)
It is easy to verify that the general solution to Eqn. (37) is of the following form







where A1 and A2 are the two integration constants. Next consider the range x ∈ [
∧
x,∞).





1(x) − rB1(x)+b =0 . (39)
The general solution to Eqn. (39) is




where D1 and D2 are the integration constants. The asymptotic condition (14) implies
that the coeﬃcient D1 will be zero as ξ1 is positive. Therefore we now have four equations
(15), (16), (17), (18) in four unknowns, A1, A2, D2 and x∗. Note that the free boundary
x∗ itself is an unknown. We solve for the value of debt in terms of x∗. Using Eqns. (15),
(17) and (18) we solve for the unknown constants A1, A2 and D2 in terms of x∗.T h i s
yields the expression for B(x) g i v e ni nE q n . ( 19). Note that we are still left with one
unknown x∗ and one equation (16). However closer examination of Eqn. (16) reveals that
it is nonlinear in the threshold x∗.T h u s x∗ can only be solved numerically from Eqn.
(16). Finally, if K ≥ b/r, then debt is riskless and hence there is no default risk. Thus
the value of debt now just equals its principal value of b/r. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Again we need to solve an ordinary diﬀerential equation subject
to boundary conditions. The ODE is given in Eqn. (23) and the boundary conditions are
stated in Eqns. (24), (25) and (26). We know that the value of the unlevered ﬁrm will be
equal to K if x<L ∗,w h e r eL∗ is deﬁned in Eqn. (21). If x ≥ L∗,t h e ng i v e nt h ep a y o ﬀ





u(x) − rVu(x)+x − a =0 (41)
the general solution of which is given by







where R1 and R2 are the constants to be determined. Given the asymptotic no bubbles
condition we immediately know that R1 equals zero. We are now left with two equations
(25), (26) in two unknowns R2 and x∗
u. Recall that x∗
u is a free boundary which deter-
mines L∗ and which itself needs to be determined. Solving the two equations for the two
unknowns yields the solution given in Eqns. (27) and (28). Q.E.D.The Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk 25
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